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Abstract 
Efforts to combat the COVID-19 crisis were characterized by a difficult trade-off: the stringency 
of the lockdowns decreased the spread of the virus, but amplified the damage to the economy. 
In this study, we analyze public attitudes toward this trade-off on the basis of a survey and 
survey-embedded experiment of more than seven thousand respondents from Southeast 
Europe, collected in April and May 2020. The results show that public opinion generally favored 
saving lives even at a steep economic cost. However, the willingness to trade lives for the 
economy was greater when the heterogeneous health and economic consequences of lockdown 
policies for the young and the elderly were emphasized. Free market views also make people 
more acceptant of higher casualties, as do fears that the instituted measures will lead to a 
permanent expansion of government control over society.  
Introduction 
The coronavirus pandemic constitutes the greatest public health crisis in over a century. 
Governments’ reactions to the threat centered on “flattening the curve”, i.e. slowing down the 
rate of infection to save lives by preventing health care systems from being overwhelmed. As 
long as there was no functioning vaccine or therapeutic medicine, the main instrument was 
social distancing, which sought to limit contacts between people by confining them to their 
homes and closing down businesses. Such measures have indeed been found to significantly 
reduce the spread of the virus and by extension its death toll (Chaudhry et al. 2020; Leffler et al. 
2020), but at a steep economic cost. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projected that in 
2020 most economies would contract by about 10 percent and that millions of jobs would be 
lost (IMF 2020). This has led many to conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic involves an 
inevitable trade-off between limiting the public health effects of the virus and preventing an 
economic collapse (Andersson et al. 2020; Carlos Garriga, Rody Manuelli, and Siddhartha Sanghi 
2020).  
This unenviable choice has spurred on the development of policy models that balance the 
health and economic aspects of the crisis response (Favero, Ichino, and Rustichini 2020; Glover 
et al. 2020; Hall, Jones, and Klenow 2020; Hammitt 2020). These models predominantly rely on 
the assumption of a utilitarian government, in which the economic cost of saving a person from 
COVID-19 should not outweigh the economic value of that person’s remaining life expectancy. 
Democratic governments, however, cannot realistically make policies based on those models. 
Eventually, they need to answer to their constituents for the actions taken during the COVID-
19-pandemic, and public views on the tradeoff between death tolls and economic performance 
seem to be guided by much more than economic calculation. As V.O. Key put it, “unless mass 
views have some place in the shaping of policy, all talk about democracy is nonsense” (Key 
1961, 7). This is why in this paper, we draw attention to public attitudes about the trade-off 
between health and wealth during the coronavirus outbreak.  
Given what we know about the role of emotion in people’s decision-making processes (Jenke 
and Huettel 2016), it is highly doubtful that public opinion will conform to the utilitarian 
suppositions of economic models. This raises the question of how people look at this trade-off 
(Olsen and Hjorth 2020). We believe there are three recurring features of the health versus 
wealth debate during the COVID-19 outbreak. The first is the framing of the dilemma. As it 
became apparent that the health and economic consequences of lockdown policies differ 
between generations, a tendency emerged to recast the trade-off as not one between 
economic value and human lives, but as one between the young and the elderly (Gustafsson 
2020; Jacobsen 2020; McWilliams 2020; Schmid 2020). The second feature is that the debate 
between health versus wealth, especially in the UK and US, seems to be conducted alongside 
the classic left-right divide, with those on the right favoring the markets and those on the left 
prioritizing saving lives (Williams 2020). A similar ideological divide has been found with regards 
to adherence to social distancing measures (Harper and Rhodes 2020; Rothgerber et al. 2020). 
The third feature of the health versus wealth debate, and of social distancing and lockdown 
policies in general, has been the concern for the loss of civil liberties and an expansion of the 
surveillance state (Hinsliff 2020; Mingardi 2020; Singer and Sang-Hun 2020; Snower 2020). After 
all, many social distance measures constitute levels of government control over society seen 
only in authoritarian regimes, and fears have emerged about whether governments will 
relinquish this control once the outbreak is over (Nyamutata 2020). 
Our research questions are guided by these three features. Are people willing to accept a 
higher death toll in an attempt to limit the damage to the economy, or is saving lives 
considered non-negotiable (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; Tetlock 2003)? Can the public be swayed by 
how the choice is framed and formulated (McGraw and Tetlock 2005)? Are preferences 
regarding this trade-off related to people’s ideological views? And what is the role of trust in 
the government? We explore the theoretical foundations of these research questions, and 
answer them on the basis of an experiment embedded in a representative survey of over 7,000 
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, collected between April 27 and May 16 
2020. With their economies in flux and politics balancing between democracy and 
authoritarianism (Bieber 2020a), the region shares many characteristics with other European 
societies, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe. As such, the three countries serve as 
excellent cases to study the health versus wealth trade-off in a non-western context.  
Dilemmas where a sacred principle or value is exchanged for economic worth, commonly 
referred to as taboo-trade-offs, have spurned on an impressive body of literature, often finding 
that people prefer principle to material gain. (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; Tetlock et al. 2000; 
Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). The present paper contributes to this body of work in two 
ways. First, taboo-trade-offs in previous studies remained largely abstract, with little relation to 
the personal lives of participants. This arguably diminishes what is at stake, and facilitates the 
tendency to act in a principled manner. Exploring the health versus wealth taboo trade-off in 
the COVID-19 pandemic is different. Never before were the consequences of a choice between 
principle and economy so tangible to so many people. Images of hospitals being overwhelmed 
by incoming patients showed the ramifications of opting to preserve the economy, while the 
economic carnage demonstrated what choosing to save lives entailed. All around the world, 
many were either affected by the crisis, knew someone who was, or considered it likely that 
they would be affected (Kämpfen et al. 2020). Second, in many trade-off experiments, 
respondents are asked whether they would exchange a sacred value for some material gain. 
However, we know from prospect theory that the expectation of gain is a weaker incentive 
than the prospect of loss (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In this study, we follow a different 
approach, offering as the alternative to the sacred principle not economic profit, but the 
avoidance of economic loss. In the survey experiment, respondents are presented with the 
opportunity to save lives or to prevent the unemployment rate from increasing. To summarize, 
in this study of taboo trade-offs, the stakes are more real, and incentives to behave in a 
materialistic fashion stronger than ever before. As such, the context and the set-up of the 
experiment make this examination of how choices are made in taboo trade-offs a critical test of 
what we know of human behavior in such unenviable dilemmas. 
The results show that a large proportion of the public rejects any concession in the effort to 
save lives, even if it means drastic increases in economic harm. Yet, reframing the choice as one 
between the life opportunities of younger generations and the lives of the elderly increases the 
willingness to make a trade-off. Putting a cost-limit on saving people from COVID-19 is also 
more prevalent among those with a free-market view on society. Finally, people who fear a 
permanent expansion of government control are more inclined to accept a higher death count, 
likely because this would mean a shorter duration of instituted government measures. 
The (im)measurable value of human life 
How is value placed on human life? In the classic trolley cart or footbridge dilemma, where a 
runaway tram threatens to kill five people, unless the respondent intervenes by changing its 
course (Foot 1977), over 90 percent of respondents thought it permissible to intervene and 
divert the tram, killing one but saving five. This shows that people are very capable and willing 
to value one life more than another. At the same time, there is strong resistance to expressing 
the value of life in monetary terms. This is because things such as human life, health, love, 
honor, justice, human rights, and increasingly nature are considered matters on which no 
economic price can be placed (Hanselmann and Tanner 2008). There is a considerable degree of 
social consensus that these values are sacred and while trading one sacred value for another is 
difficult but acceptable, in what is referred to as a ‘tragic trade-off’ (Mandel and Vartanian 
2008), exchanging them for secular values such as, money, consumption, or employment  
incites outrage and indignation (Tetlock, Mellers, and Scoblic 2017). This is because it reflects 
on people’s social identity and the extent to which they can uphold an image of being a moral 
and social being (Fiske and Tetlock 1997; Shiell, Sperber, and Porat 2009). People’s identity as 
functioning members of a society would arguably be undermined if they were willing to 
sacrifice a substantial portion of that society to illness for economic gain. As a result, we expect 
public opinion to be skewed towards a refusal of a trade-off between health and wealth during 
the coronavirus outbreak, and instead to generally favor saving lives even at a steep economic 
cost. This is our hypothesis H1. 
Many of the choices considered taboo are inevitable, given the limited nature of many 
resources. Despite the threat to their identity, most people are aware of this, and are willingly 
susceptible to the manner in which a taboo trade-off is presented (Tetlock 2003). Studies have 
found that when good arguments are provided, or when a taboo trade-off is reframed, people 
take fewer issues with it, especially when the cost of upholding sacred values becomes 
prohibitive (McGraw and Tetlock 2005). Generally, this process of reframing involves invoking 
cheap rhetorical references to the ‘greater good’ (Peter McGraw, Schwartz, and Tetlock 2012), 
or recasting a taboo trade-off into a tragic trade-off (Zaal et al. 2014; Stikvoort, Lindahl, and 
Daw 2016). During the first wave of the COVID-19-pandemic, we saw the emergence of such a 
recasting occur, especially in the United States. Texas lieutenant governor Dan Patrick, for 
example, argued that “lots of grandparents are willing to die to save the economy for their 
grandchildren” (Stieb 2020), a view supported by several conservative radio and television 
hosts (Noah Millman 2020). According to this narrative, future generations were having their 
life opportunities reduced in an effort to save those whose deaths were inevitable anyway and 
who were thought to ‘already have had their lives’ (Ayalon 2020; Fraser et al. 2020). In this 
reframing, the choice in how to deal with the COVID-19-outbreak is not one between saving 
lives and saving the economy, but between saving one set of lives (i.e. the young) and another 
(i.e. the elderly). Viewed this way, lives would be lost, regardless of the direction chosen. 
Guided by the existing literature, we expect this reframing to be effective and successful in 
making people more willing to consider options normally deemed taboo. More specifically, our 
hypothesis H2 is that respondents are more willing to trade lives for economic welfare during 
the COVID-19 pandemic when this trade-off is reframed in generational terms.  
Regardless of a general social consensus, individuals differ in the degree to which something is 
considered sacred and secular, and thus which trade-offs are taboo. As values are inevitably 
political in nature, it is reasonable to expect their sanctity to be contingent on political ideology. 
Tetlock et al. (2000) found that trade-offs such as selling organs and buying U.S. citizenship 
generated less moral outrage among those who opposed government regulations on business 
and government involvement in income redistribution. Building on these findings, we expect 
the willingness to consider the trade-off between saving lives and saving the economy to be 
greater among those with free-market views on the organization of society. The mechanism 
here is one of socialization. Supporters of free-market policies have grown accustomed to 
evaluating the access to something, be it public transportation, education, or healthcare. At its 
most extreme, a neoliberal worldview considers everything to have a price, and nothing to be 
sacred (e.g. Brennan and Jaworski 2016). Having adopted such a line of thinking, the thought of 
exchanging lives for the sake of the economy can be less inciting of moral outrage, as it is seen 
as more normal. In contrast, critics of the free market and people with more socialist-oriented 
policy views consider access to certain things as a right and thus exempt from financial 
considerations (Sandel 2012; Satz 2012). Consequently, they are more likely to object to the 
trade-off. Our hypothesis H3 is thus: Respondents holding policy views supportive of the free 
market are more willing to trade lives for economic welfare during the COVID-19 pandemic. 
While the duration of social distance measures is basically a trade-off between health and 
wealth, there is another dimension to consider. The enforcement of such measures and the 
effective combating of the virus outbreak has been accompanied by increased central planning 
and bureaucratization, and an expansion of the surveillance state and erosion of civil rights 
(Cooper and Aitchison 2020). In an effort to halt the spread of the virus, governments have 
closed schools and businesses, and in several examples even installed a curfew. Unsurprisingly, 
concerns have been raised over whether these emergency measures will be relinquished once 
the crisis passes, or whether governments will use the pandemic as a prelude to permanently 
expanding their control over citizens (Gebrekidan 2020). The threat of authoritarianism is very 
much real, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. Some countries in the region such as 
Poland, Hungary, and Serbia have already shown signs of democratic backsliding prior to the 
COVID-19 outbreak, and the pandemic only exacerbates this trend (Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała 
2020; Petrov 2020). Crisis moments such as terror attacks or pandemics increase the support 
for government control and suspension of civil liberties to tackle the threat (Huddy et al. 2005; 
Amat et al. 2020). In normal times, however, people prefer democratic over autocratic rule 
regardless of region or the age of their democracy (Fuchs, Guidorossi, and Svensson 1998; 
Tessler 2002; Sin and Wells 2005). Therefore, in line with previous studies on taboo trade-offs, 
we argue that the desire to decrease government control and to reinstitute civil liberties after 
the crisis has been defeated constitutes a sacred value. This value enters consideration when 
someone questions the sincerity of the government to use emergency powers for the duration 
of the pandemic only. This reframes the trade-off between saving lives and saving the economy 
as a tragic trade-off between public health and civil liberties. This is why we propose that 
respondents who distrust their government’s institution of emergency measures should be 
more willing to accept COVID-19 casualties because such a choice would imply a shorter 
duration of the emergency powers and a smaller chance that such powers will be held on to 
permanently. This is our final hypothesis H4. 
To summarize, the existing studies on people’s willingness to trade sacred values for secular 
ones guide us to the following hypotheses on public attitudes towards the health versus wealth 
dilemma during the COVID-19 pandemic. First, the most common response is a refusal to 
accept a higher COVID-19 casualty count in order to reduce the harm done to the economy 
(H1). Second, reframing the choice as one between the lives of the young and the old makes 
the trade-off more acceptable (H2). Third, free-market liberals are more willing than socialists 
to put an economic price on saving lives (H3). Fourth and final, people worried about whether 
their government will relinquish the emergency powers once the virus has been defeated are 
more willing to accept casualties (H4). 
Data and Methods 
To examine the degree to which people are willing to trade COVID-19 fatalities for economic 
prosperity, we analyze data from an experiment embedded in an online survey of citizens from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia. Respondents were recruited with Facebook’s 
Marketing API, using quota sampling. Since roughly half the populations in these countries have 
a Facebook account,1 this approach gives researchers access to a massive panel of respondents, 
while at the same time enabling them to fine-tune ads to target specific demographic groups 
and subpopulations (Zhang et al. 2018). A large number of strata in each of the three countries 
were identified according to several demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, and 
region/county).2 In the end, data from a sample of 7049 respondents was collected, 2211 from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2255 from Croatia, and 2583 from Serbia.3 Together with the use of survey 
                                                          
1 According to www.internetworldstats.com. 
2 We identified 238 strata in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 294 in Croatia, and 400 in Serbia. 
3 This sample was obtained after excluding 2059 respondents who had given false answers, not responded to all 
questions, or filled in the survey too fast. 
weights (see Ansolabehere and Rivers 2013), these samples are representative of their 
respective populations.4 
The survey data was collected between 27 April and 16 May 2020. Figure 1 shows how the 
three countries were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic.5 All three experienced strong growth 
of the number of COVID-19 cases and casualties in the first half of April 2020. The time-line of 
the spread of the virus follows a pattern similar to other Central and East European countries, 
where the pandemic broke out slightly later than in Western Europe (Bieber 2020b). This delay 
gave governments time to implement strict social distancing measures that resulted in a mild 
first wave of the outbreak (Radojevic 2020), though Bosnia-Herzegovina saw a surge in COVID-
19 deaths in early May.6 While the intensity of the health consequences were lower than in 
some other European countries, the fact that news cycles were dominated by COVID-19, and 
the proximity to severely hit countries like Italy, arguably made the trade-off between saving 
lives and saving the economy no less tangible. In addition, around the time that the survey was 
collected (grey shaded area in Figure 1) economic consequences became increasingly apparent 
(World Bank 2020), resulting in a re-evaluation and loosening of the restrictions (Bieber 2020b). 
In sum, survey data used in this study was collected at a moment when both the health and 
economic ramifications were clear. As such, the three countries are excellent cases to examine 
                                                          
4 The highest assigned weight in the analyses is 3.19 (mean = 1), which is similar or even smaller than the weights 
used in other surveys, such as the European Social Survey. In the Appendix, we show the distributions of the 
various political variables included in the analyses. In addition, The Appendix compares the sample to the various 
populations in terms of age, gender, education, and ethnicity.  In all instances, the sample mirrors the population 
extremely well. 
5 We acknowledge that comparisons between countries based on official numbers is hampered by methodological 
differences in how COVID-19 cases are counted. However, they do allow us to get an idea of how severely the crisis 
was perceived by respondents when the survey was conducted. 
6 Robustness checks showed that the results are not substantially altered when respondents from Bosnia-
Herzegovina are excluded. 
public attitudes on the trade-off between preventing COVID-19 deaths and minimizing 
economic damage. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To gauge people’s responses to the COVID-19 trade-off between saving lives and saving the 
economy, respondents were asked to decide how long social distance measures should be 
enforced. They were able to choose from a list of ten scenarios, with the consequences in terms 
of the expected total COVID-19 casualties and unemployment described for each scenario. The 
first scenario extended the measures for a long time, minimizing casualties, but resulting in a 
massive increase in unemployment. The tenth scenario, in contrast, saw a quick reopening of 
the country, letting the virus essentially spread freely. This would hypothetically minimize the 
economic impact, but lead to a situation where two percent of the population would die from 
COVID-19. Table 1 gives an overview of all scenarios in the Bosnia-Herzegovina survey (death 
figures were adjusted for population in Croatia and Serbia). Respondents’ choice of scenario is 
the dependent variable in our analyses: Trade-off willingness. COVID-19 casualties were given 
in absolute numbers that increased exponentially across scenarios, mirroring the spread of a 
pandemic. The death toll in the first scenario was not far off the number of actual COVID-19 
casualties in all countries at the time the survey launched. As such, a preference for that 
scenario can be interpreted as a refusal to sacrifice any lives for the sake of the economy 
Unemployment was expressed in percentage point increases, changing linearly from one 
scenario to the next. We opted for unemployment as the metric in which to express the 
economic side of the dilemma because it is easy to understand for respondents, and because it 
has been found to be an important indicator of economic performance, shaping people’s 
political attitudes (Kunovich 2012). While unemployment undoubtedly has a human-interest 
factor, it remains essentially a monetary problem, as layoffs and furlough schemes increase 
government expenditures and reduce tax revenue. As such, unemployment is an issue whose 
solution is hampered primarily by the lack of sufficient financial resources.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
To test the effects of reframing the taboo trade-off between health and wealth into a tragic 
trade-off between old and young people, we conducted a survey experiment. Specifically, a 
second version of the trade-off question was designed that stressed the fact that the economic 
recession would diminish the opportunities of younger generations, while the older generations 
would carry the brunt of the public health consequences. Respondents were assigned at 
random to either the control or the experimental version of the trade-off question. Their 
precise formulations are presented below, with the italic text added in the latter. In the 
analyses, the impact of the tragic trade-off reframing is captured by a binary variable that 
indicates which version of the trade-off question was shown to respondents. 
Imagine you are the leader of your country and you have to make a decision on when to 
end the measures to combat the spread of the coronavirus and let normal life resume. 
Economic and public health experts have outlined 10 scenarios for you to choose from. 
Keeping the restrictions on travel and businesses on for a long time will save lives, but at 
the cost of more damage to the economy resulting in a higher unemployment rate. 
Conversely, a short duration of the government measures will result in more casualties, 
but also in a smaller increase in unemployment. These consequences, however, are not 
equally distributed across society. The additional casualties will primarily be found 
among older generations and retirees, while higher unemployment would primarily hit 
younger generations and diminish the economic opportunities of future generations. 
The second main independent variable in our analysis is Free-market views. These are captured 
by averaging people’s responses to five policy statements on the role of the government in the 
economy and the redistribution of wealth, separating liberals from socialists. We believe this 
divide is one of the two principal structuring policy dimensions in South-East Europe. In our 
analyses, we also account for the second dimension, which revolves around the protection and 
cultivation of a national identity based on ethnic membership, and which separates 
cosmopolitans from nationalists (Massey, Hodson, and Sekulic 2003). This variable, 
Nationalism, is measured in a similar way as Free-market views, by averaging responses to five 
policy statements. The third main independent variable indicates someone’s Distrust in the 
government concerning its COVID-19 emergency measures and powers. We rely here on the 
following yes-no question: “Do you believe that your government will relinquish all its 
emergency powers once the crisis is over or will they keep exercising at least some of them 
permanently?” Naturally, the answers to this question will correlate with support for the sitting 
government. To avoid a spurious relation, we control for whether a respondent voted for the 
ruling coalition in the last election (Government supporter). 
In addition, we account for gender, age, employment status, income, ethnicity, and education. 
Regarding the latter, we distinguish among three groups: lower educated voters only have an 
elementary school degree, middle educated voters are those who have finished their secondary 
education, and higher educated voters are those who have a graduate or university degree. As 
the survey’s questions were about politics, it is likely that it attracted politically interested 
individuals. To account for this, we control for political interest, measured on an 11-point self-
placement scale, in all our analyses. The models also control for a number of COVID-19-
indicators. The first is COVID-19 ignorance, calculated as the logged absolute difference 
between respondents’ estimate of the official number of infected people in their country and 
the actual number of infections on the day the survey was filled in.7 In addition, we include the 
number of new COVID-19 deaths on the day respondents completed the survey per 100,000 
residents, as well as the Stringency index. This last variable is a score that ranges from 0 to 100, 
and is based on the sum of nine indicators of a country’s response to the pandemic such as 
school closures and restrictions on public gatherings (Hale et al. 2020). Normally, the inclusion 
of these two time-related variables requires the use of a multilevel modelling strategy. 
However, the likelihood ratio test indicated that the goodness of fit did not significantly differ 
between the single-level and multilevel model, as did the coefficients. Therefore, in the next 
section, we report the findings of the former. In our analyses, we pool the data from the three 
countries and account for country-level differences by including country dummies. Finally, 
because the COVID-19-outbreak was rapidly evolving, with daily new developments, we add 
day dummies to all models. Table 2 gives an overview of all variables. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Results 
                                                          
7 All data regarding Covid cases and casualties were supplied by https://ourworldindata.org/. 
Before testing the effects of various explanatory variables in a multivariate model, we examine 
the distribution of responses to the COVID-19 trade-off between saving lives and saving the 
economy in Figure 2. It shows that over 40% of respondents opted for the scenario where the 
number of COVID-related deaths was minimized, at the expense of a massive increase in 
unemployment, making it by far the most selected scenario and providing strong support for 
our hypothesis H1. While the majority of respondents would make at least some trade-off, the 
distribution of preferences clearly favors a prioritization of saving lives. This trend is in line with 
previous research that concluded that when faced with a choice between a sacred and a secular 
value, most people would refuse to make any trade-off. Instead, in an attempt to morally 
cleanse themselves of any affiliation with the trade-off, they reaffirm their support for the 
sacred value.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
For the multivariate analyses, we use a logit model on a dichotomized version of the dependent 
variable, with one category consisting of respondents that preferred minimum deaths at the 
expense of maximum unemployment (scenario 1; value 0), and second category made up of 
respondents who chose any of the other nine scenarios (value 1). The reasons for this are 
twofold. First, this approach reflects the distribution of people’s attitudes on the health versus 
wealth trade-off. Second, models that make use of all ten options, such as ordered logit and 
OLS regression, violate crucial assumptions. Specifically, an order logit model violates the 
parallel odds assumption, and the OLS regression violates the assumption of normally 
distributed residuals. Nevertheless, the results of these models, presented in the Appendix, are 
in line with the results reported in the logit models below. 
Table 3 presents the results of the analyses. Models 1 to 3 gradually introduce key independent 
variables, while Model 4 tests their robustness by including all control variables. In other words, 
the models become increasingly stringent tests of our key expectations. Model 1 tests the 
effect of the reframing, showing that it is significantly and positively related to the willingness 
to make the trade-off. This indicates that the recasting of the choice between health and 
wealth into the one between different generations of people is an effective way of making 
people more willing to consider the trade-off. The left panel in Figure 3 depicts how the change 
in this willingness depends on the framing of the trade-off. Fifty-six percent of respondents 
were willing to make the trade-off when the dilemma was recast into a tragic choice between 
the old and the young: a four percentage points increase when compared to the control 
condition. This result supports hypothesis H2, and suggests that when pundits tried to sway 
people to favor reopening the economy, emphasizing the consequences for younger 
generations was an effective strategy. In addition, we explored whether the impact of 
reframing was conditional on the other main explanatory variables or the covariates, including 
age and free-market views, but this was not the case (models not reported). As such, the results 
thus suggest that the impact of the experimental treatment is not heterogeneous or contingent 
on other factors. 
Model 2 introduces Free-market views. The variable is significant and its effect is in the 
expected direction. The more someone favors free-market solutions to social problems, the 
more they are willing to put a price on saving lives from COVID-19 – a confirmation of our 
hypothesis H3. A one standard deviation increase in Free-market views (SD = 0.58) increases 
the willingness to make the trade-off by 2.43 percentage points. This stark difference shows 
that the decision to halt the spread of the virus at a substantial economic cost is very much a 
political choice, and cannot be considered a valence issue among the public that enjoys support 
across the political spectrum. Model 3 adds distrust in the government regarding COVID-19-
related emergency powers. Its effect is positive and highly significant, meaning that distrust 
makes people accept a higher COVID-19 death toll, likely because that would mean a quicker 
end to the emergency powers and social distancing measures. This provides clear and strong 
support for our last hypothesis H4. Among those who trust the government, 52.5 percent is 
willing to make the trade-off, while this climbs to 61.5 percent among those who fear a 
permanent increase in government control and surveillance (left panel in Figure 3). 
While these effect sizes may appear small at first, it is important to keep in mind that even 
small effects can have large societal consequences (Greenwald, Banaji, and Nosek 2015; 
Rosenthal 1990). Minor shift in COVID policies in the region can mean the difference between 
thousands of people dying or surviving the pandemic, and between tens of thousands losing or 
keeping their jobs. An illustrative example of this can be found in the decision of the Lebanese 
government to allow bars and restaurants to open between Christmas and New Year. Though a 
seemingly small concession, it resulted in a massive spike in COVID-19 patients that threatened 
to overwhelm the healthcare system, and ultimately forced the government to institute a 
draconian lockdown, in which even supermarkets had to close (Sarah El Deeb 2021).  
Model 4 adds all covariates, demonstrating the robustness of the main explanatory factors. The 
model also reveals some interesting effects of the control variables. Government supporters 
are less willing to trade lives for a reduced economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. The most 
likely explanation is that in case of doubt, people follow the cues of those they trust. When 
assessing arguments on complicated issues that require specialized knowledge, people are 
more likely to rely on what Petty and Cacioppo (1986) referred to as the peripheral route in 
information processing. In contrast to the central route, in which the substantive content and 
the plausibility of arguments is considered, the peripheral route relies more on the credibility of 
the message’s source. In spite of an arguably strong motivation to use the central route 
regarding anything related to the COVID-19 pandemic, the lack of knowledge on the topic is 
likely to close off that route and force people to use peripheral cues (Gilens and Murakawa 
2002). A large body of research has found that messages are more trusted by recipients who 
share the party label of the sender (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009; Kam 2005). Given that 
the official response was one that very much sought to save lives, it is unsurprising that 
government supporters respond to the trade-off in a similar fashion. 
Views on the trade-off also differ between men and women; with the latter being almost 7 
percentage points less likely than men to trade lives for employment (panel 2 in Figure 4). This 
seems to support the view that gender differences in socialization make men more 
instrumental and, consequently, more willing to trade in sacred for secular values (Kennedy and 
Kray 2014). In contrast, women place higher importance on the morality of their actions (Kray 
and Haselhuhn 2012). Age is also significant and, expectedly, older respondents are less willing 
to make the trade-off than younger people are. However, the introduction of a squared term 
reveals a non-linear relationship (panel 3 in Figure 4).8 The preparedness to accept more 
COVID-19 deaths for the sake of the economy decreases until the age of 50. After that, we see 
                                                          
8 To avoid small coefficients in Table 3, the squared values of age have been divided by 1000. 
the relation turn positive, to such a degree even that the views of the elderly on the trade-off 
are similar to those of younger generations. This seems to suggest that the claim that there is a 
willingness among the old to accept the health risks in order to avoid an economic recession 
has some empirical support. The trade-off between health and wealth is more likely to be taboo 
among the lower educated than it is among the higher educated. This is somewhat of an 
unexpected finding, as the former are more vulnerable to the consequences of an economic 
crisis than the latter are. Finally, model 4 shows that people’s views on the dilemma between 
saving lives and saving the economy differs between ethnic groups. Croats seem to be most 
willing to exchange lives for employment (62.7%), while Serbs are least willing to making the 
trade-off (53.7%). It is possible that this due to Croatia having a more developed market 
economy, which also encouraged the development of market-oriented views among Croats in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Conclusion 
During the initial stages of the COVID-19 outbreak, many governments made the decision to 
take drastic action and limit social and economic life. In the majority of cases, these measures 
were successful in stemming the spread of the virus, but at an enormous economic cost. While 
the decision to put health over economy was not entirely uncontested (Pleyers 2020), the 
results of this study show that it had strong public support, at least during the first wave of the 
pandemic. Only a small minority of respondents favored letting the virus spread freely to avoid 
a recession. The policy decisions taken in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia are unlikely 
to have been the most utilitarian (Andersson et al. 2020), but they did carry democratic 
legitimacy. In addition, as the trade-off was more tangible than ever with the pandemic in full 
swing, and the incentives to choose economy over principle stronger compared to previous 
studies by tapping into respondents’ loss aversion instincts, this is to date arguably one of the 
most compelling pieces of evidence that people choose sacred over secular values. 
We did find, however, that the willingness to make the trade-off between saving lives and 
saving the economy was greater when the consequences of a recession on life opportunities of 
younger generations was emphasized, among those who favored free-market solutions, and 
when people distrusted their governments to relinquish the emergency powers once the crisis 
has subsided. Our results shed light on the drivers behind the variation in public reactions to 
social distance measures, especially between Europe and the United States. With attempts at 
reframing the trade-off, a greater reliance on the free market, and a cultural tradition of 
skepticism towards government control, it should come as no surprise that the public response 
to social distancing measures in the United States was so polarized (Allcott et al. 2020). In 
contrast, public opinion in Europe was far more acceptant of efforts to stop the virus’ spread. 
While survey-based results inevitably raise concerns that they are non-reflective of actual 
behavior or even borne out of social desirability, there are clear indications that this is not the 
case here. First, other studies have found that one’s preference in the health versus wealth 
trade-off affects the willingness to adhere to COVID measures (Olsen and Hjorth 2020). Second, 
it has been argued that in Croatia, the ruling party HDZ has its strong handling of the pandemic 
to thank for it victory in the July 2020 elections, despite trailing in the polls for a long time 
(Sircar 2020). As is evident from Figure 1, the government instituted strict measures, resulting 
in mild first wave, for which it was rewarded at the polls with reelection. Unfortunately, this 
was not the lesson learned by governments, as is evident from the horrendous second and third 
waves of COVID-19 cases that hit the region resulting from looser measures after the elections 
(BIRN 2021). 
The results of this study remind us that the homo sociologicus (Dahrendorf 2006/1964), whose 
actions are guided by internalized values rather than material self-interest, is still very much 
alive (also see Tao and Au 2014). Regardless of the opportunity costs, some trade-offs should 
simply not be considered. Max Weber argued that modernity and the capitalist society thrust 
upon individuals the rationalization and disenchantment of ultimate values, and their 
replacement by “the pursuit of materialistic and mundane ends” through bureaucratic 
calculation (Gane 2002, 15; also see Koshul 2005, 17–28). The limits to utilitarian technocratic 
rule discovered here, together with the inevitability of taboo trade-offs, arguably puts 
governments between a rock and hard place. Yet, perhaps we should be glad that despite the 
rationalization and disenchantment of society, some values, such as human life, are still sacred. 
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Table 1: Scenarios in the trade-off question between saving lives and saving the economy during 
COVID-19 (Bosnia-Herzegovina survey) 
Scenario Increase in unemployment level Total coronavirus deaths 
1: minimum casualties, 
maximum unemployment 30% 200 
2 27% 400 
3 24% 800 
4 21% 1500 
5 18% 2900 
6 15% 5600 
7 12% 11000 
8 9% 21000 
9 6% 42000 
10: maximum casualties, 
minimum unemployment 3% 82000 
 
  
Table 2: Descriptives of all variables 
    Mean     S.D. Min. Max. 
Trade-off willingness 3.54 2.83 1 10 
Tragic trade-off reframing (0 = control 
condition; 1 = tragic trade-off reframing) 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Free-market views (1 = low free-market 
views, 5 = high free-market views) 2.23 0.58 1 5 
Distrust in government (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.66 0.48 0 1 
Nationalism (1 = low nationalism, 5 = 
high nationalism) 2.83 0.75 1 5 
Government supporter (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Gender (1 = male, 2 = female) 1.52 0.50 1 2 
Age (years) 45.38 14.10 18 95 
Unemployed (0 = no; 1 = yes) 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Income (deciles) 5.24 2.88 1 10 
Lower education 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Middle education 0.51 0.50 0 1 
Higher education 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Bosniak 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Croat 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Serb 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Other 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Political interest (0 = low interest in 
politics; 10 = high interest in politics) 4.92 3.25 0 10 
COVID-19 ignorance 6.30 2.28 0 13.81 
New COVID-19 deaths 6.82 3.48 0 24.38 
Stringency index 90.91 5.30 70.37 96.30 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Croatia 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Serbia 0.49 0.50 0 1 




Table 3: Analyses of trade-off willingness 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p 
Tragic trade-off reframing 0.17 (0.06) 0.004 0.17 (0.06) 0.004 0.17 (0.06) 0.003 0.17 (0.06) 0.003 
Free-market views    0.16 (0.05) 0.003 0.18 (0.05) 0.001 0.17 (0.05) 0.002 
Distrust in government       0.39 (0.06) 0.000 0.35 (0.06) 0.000 
Nationalism          -0.04 (0.04) 0.357 
Government supporter          -0.22 (0.08) 0.009 
Gender          -0.24 (0.06) 0.000 
Age          -0.04 (0.01) 0.000 
Age²          0.45 (0.15) 0.002 
Unemployed          0.00 (0.07) 0.954 
Income          0.02 (0.01) 0.066 
Lower education (ref. cat.)             
Middle education          0.16 (0.07) 0.024 
Higher education          0.20 (0.07) 0.006 
Bosniak          0.18 (0.11) 0.116 
Croat          0.37 (0.13) 0.004 
Serb (ref. cat.)             
Other          0.46 (0.10) 0.000 
Political interest          0.00 (0.01) 0.649 
Constant 0.04 (0.12) 0.759 -0.22 (0.17) 0.124 -0.22 (0.15) 0.001 -0.37 (1.06) 0.727 
Country, Time, and COVID 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
n 7049 7049 7049 7049 
Pseudo R² 0.87% 1.01% 1.61% 2.88% 
Note: Cell entries are log odds from logistic regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The p-values are the results of two-tailed tests of the 
coefficients. 
 
Figure 1: The COVID-19 crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia, March-July 2020 
 
Note: The numbers are those listed on https://ourworldindata.org on August 30 2020. The lines indicating new cases 
and deaths represent the 7-day moving average per 100,000 inhabitants. 
 
  
Figure 2: Histogram of scenarios chosen in the COVID-19 dilemma 
 
 
Figure 3: Marginal effects of the main explanatory variables on trade-off willingness 
 
Note: The predicted probabilities of choosing the first scenario (minimum death, maximum unemployment) are based on the results of Model 4, Table 3. When 
calculating the probabilities, all other variables are kept at their mean value. The error bars/gray area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Figure 4: Marginal effects of the control variables on trade-off willingness 
 
Note: The predicted probabilities of choosing the first scenario (minimum death, maximum unemployment) are based on the results of Model 4, Table 3. When 
calculating the probabilities, all other variables are kept at their mean value. The error bars/gray area represents the 95% confidence interval.
Appendix 
Figure A1: Sample distribution plots 
 
 
Figure A2: Population comparison plots 
   
Table A1: Analyses of trade-off willingness 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p 
Tragic trade-off reframing 0.12 (0.05) 0.029 0.12 (0.05) 0.027 0.12 (0.05) 0.028 0.12 (0.05) 0.019 
Free-market views     0.10 (0.05) 0.051 0.13 (0.05) 0.013 0.13 (0.05) 0.015 
Distrust in government         0.44 (0.06) 0.000 0.41 (0.06) 0.000 
Nationalism             0.00 (0.04) 0.905 
Government supporter             -0.20 (0.08) 0.012 
Gender             -0.28 (0.05) 0.000 
Age             -0.03 (0.01) 0.003 
Age²             0.36 (0.13) 0.007 
Unemployed             0.06 (0.07) 0.401 
Income             0.02 (0.01) 0.031 
Lower education (ref. cat.)                
Middle education             0.12 (0.06) 0.056 
Higher education             0.11 (0.07) 0.087 
Bosniak             0.11 (0.10) 0.289 
Croat             0.32 (0.12) 0.006 
Serb (ref. cat.)                
Other             0.37 (0.01) 0.000 
Political interest             0.00 (0.01) 0.821 
Country, Time, and COVID 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
n 7049 7049 7049 7049 
Pseudo R² 0.36% 0.38% 0.73% 1.25% 
 Note: Cell entries are log odds from ordered logistic regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The models violate the parallel odds 
assumption and should be interpreted with caution. The p-values are the results of two-tailed tests of the coefficients. 
  
Table A2: Analyses of trade-off willingness 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p Coeff. (s.e.) p 
Tragic trade-off reframing 0.13 (0.08) 0.102 0.14 (0.08) 0.098 0.14 (0.08) 0.086 0.14 (0.08) 0.076 
Free-market views    0.11 (0.08) 0.162 0.15 (0.08) 0.062 0.15 (0.08) 0.062 
Distrust in government       0.70 (0.08) 0.000 0.65 (0.08) 0.000 
Nationalism          0.04 (0.06) 0.458 
Government supporter          -0.27 (0.12) 0.023 
Gender          -0.43 (0.08) 0.000 
Age          -0.05 (0.02) 0.009 
Age²          0.51 (0.21) 0.015 
Unemployed          0.16 (0.10) 0.105 
Income          0.03 (0.02) 0.047 
Lower education (ref. cat.)             
Middle education          0.16 (0.09) 0.080 
Higher education          0.11 (0.10) 0.237 
Bosniak          0.12 (0.19) 0.443 
Croat          0.47 (0.18) 0.010 
Serb (ref. cat.)             
Other          0.52 (0.14) 0.000 
Political interest          -0.01 (0.01) 0.638 
Constant 3.57 (0.12) 0.000 3.32 (0.22) 0.000 2.80 (0.22) 0.000 1.67 (1.40) 0.235 
Country, Time, and COVID 
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
n 7049 7049 7049 7049 
Adj. R² 1.33% 1.38% 2.74% 4.62% 
 Note: Cell entries are unstandardized coefficients from least-squared regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses. The models violate the 
normally distributed residuals assumption and should be interpreted with caution. The p-values are the results of two-tailed tests of the coefficients. 
 
